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Beginning as early as the 19th century,' the government of the
United States recognized some form of the "state secrets
privilege" as a partial or complete defense to civil litigation in
U.S. courts. Although mostly dormant until the seminal case,
United States v. Reynolds,2 which marked the first time the
Supreme Court formally recognized the state secrets privilege,3 the
doctrine's long history helps color its evolving standard and may
help predict its future. From the privilege's original usage as a
complete dismissal of a case,4 to its more relaxed usage as a

t B.S.B.A., University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill, 2009; J.D., University of North
Carolina School of Law, 2014. I am grateful to Professor Scott Silliman for inspiring this
paper and for his help in the editing process.
I Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits ofNational Security Litigation,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1271 (2007) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803)).
2 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
3 Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 82
(2010).
4

See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
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discretionary bar to the introduction of evidence,s a recent
explosion in the invoking of the privilege in our post-9/11 world6
has led to multiple calls for reform.' This article argues that the
current Reynolds standard allowing a judge to dismiss a case
before viewing in camera any supposedly confidential information
must be reformed in favor of a more plaintiff-friendly standard.
The article pushes for a new standard in which judges would be
required to view privileged information and make a determination
on its admissibility unless they find prior to discovery that the case
meets the very narrow Totten standard.
The article will proceed in four parts. Part I traces a recent
history of the case law beginning with Totten in 1875 and
continuing through current day jurisprudence. Part II outlines the
current standard as interpreted today through Reynolds and explain
the guidelines that current judges are supposed to follow when
faced with a state secrets case. Part III explores whether the
doctrine is a constitutional or common-law precept, and thus
whether the doctrine can be changed through the evolution of
common law. Finally, Part IV makes recommendations for reform
to the state secrets privilege, especially in light of its broadening
scope in our age of information technology.
I. Tracing Totten, From Dismissal to Privilege-The History
of the State Secrets Doctrine
While the idea of a state secrets privilege can be traced to the
early 1800s,' the modem doctrine found its roots in Totten v.
United States.9 In the case, the estate for an alleged spy for
President Lincoln during the Civil War claimed that he was owed
$200 pursuant to a contract with Lincoln to procure information
from the South.'o The Court of Claims found that the spy did
5 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1.
6 Holly Wells, The State Secrets Privilege: Overuse Causing Unintended

Consequences,50 ARIZ. L. REV. 967, 968 (2008).
7 Steven D. Schwinn, The State Secrets Privilege in the Post-9/11 Era, 30 PACE L.
REV. 778, 779 (2010).
8 Chesney, supra note 1, at 1271 (explaining that the dicta in Marbury v. Madison
indicated that the confidential information of government officials would not have to be
disclosed in certain situations).
9 Totten, 92 U.S. at 105.
10 Id at 105-06.
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indeed have a contract with the President, and had completed his
duties, but was only reimbursed for his expenses." However, the
Court dismissed the claim, being divided on the power of the
President to bind the United States to a contract for spying.12 The
Court had no problem validating the power of the President to
employ such spies during times of war, but opined that as a
clandestine matter, the claim was not justiciable." In its holding,
the Court explained "that public policy forbids the maintenance of
any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably
lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence
to be violated." 4 The Court stated that this bar to suit would by
implication apply to matters involving "secret employments of the
government in time of war, or upon matters affecting our foreign
relations, where a disclosure of the service might compromise or
embarrass our government in its public duties, or endanger the
person or injure the character of the agent."" Thus, as originally
envisioned, the state secrets privilege was not truly a privilege, but
a complete ban (the "Totten ban")' 6 to suits "where the very
subject matter of the action . . . was a matter of state secret." 7

Additionally, the Court made this determination sua sponte, which
differs from how courts analyze Reynolds challenges, which will
be discussed later in this article.'
In the years following the Totten decision, treatises began
mentioning the state secrets privilege, and several cases cited
Totten when blocking discovery of confidential information.1
However, it wasn't until the Reynolds decision in 1953 that the
Court formally recognized a state secrets privilege.2 0 In fact, in the
near century and a half since the decision, the "Totten ban" has

I Id at 106.
12

Id

'3

Id.

14 Id. at 107.

Totten, 92 U.S. at 106.
Schwinn, supra note 7, at 781.
17 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 n.26 (1953).
18 Chesney, supra note 1,at 1278.
19 Id. at 1280-82.
20 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7 (1953).
15

16
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been used to completely dismiss a case only a handful of times.
In Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/PeaceEducation
Project, et al.,21 the Navy was constructing ammunition and
weapons storage facilities with the capacity to hold nuclear
weapons in Hawaii.22 Under the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, federal agencies are required to file an environmental
impact statement when making proposals that will significantly
affect the environment, "to the fullest extent possible."23 The
Navy conducted an environmental impact assessment, and after
determining that the facilities would not have an environmental
impact, did not prepare an environmental impact statement.24 As
the Navy considered the information "classified for national
security reasons," the information was not released to the public.25
Respondents brought suit, demanding an environmental impact
statement be prepared and released to the public. 26 The court of
appeals found in favor of the respondents and required the Navy to
release to the public a hypothetical impact statement.27
On appeal, the Supreme Court did an analysis of whether the
Navy had complied with the law "to the fullest extent possible,"
ultimately finding the claim to be a non-justiciable issue. 28 Citing
Totten, the Court held that public policy prevented the suit from
being tried, as the case concerned matters that were confidential
and trial would lead to their disclosure.29 In this case, the "Totten
ban" was invoked by the court on its own, in response to a matter
directly affecting national security.
The Court revisited Totten in 2005 when deciding the case of
Tenet v. Doe.3 0 A husband and wife team, spying for the United
States during the Cold War, alleged that they carried out years of

21 Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, et al., 454
U.S. 139 (2011).
22

Id. at 139.

23

Id.

24

Id.
Id.
26 Id.
27 Weinberger,454 U.S. at 139.
25

28 Id. at 146.
29 Id at 147.

30 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005).
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espionage for the U.S. government in return for a promise of
sanctuary and compensation in the United States. 3' After the spies
defected and became U.S. citizens, the U.S. government assisted
the male spy in obtaining employment, and he agreed to the
discontinuation of his CIA benefits.32 Soon after, the respondent
was laid off from his job and brought suit when the CIA denied
him any future benefits.
In this case, the government cited Totten as a defense, alleging
that the very essence of the espionage contract was secret and
needed to remain secret.34 The court of appeals originally rejected
the government's Totten claim, stating that it had been "recast
simply as an early expression of the evidentiary 'state secrets'
privilege, rather than a categorical bar to their claims." 3
The
Supreme Court disagreed.3 6 The Court explained that Reynolds
"in no way signaled our retreat from Totten 's broader holding that
lawsuits premised on alleged espionage agreements are altogether
forbidden."37 The Court went on to explain that Reynolds actually
"refutes this very suggestion," as the Reynolds Court cited Totten
as a case that would be "'dismissed on the pleadings without ever
reaching the question of evidence, since it was so obvious that the
action should never prevail over the privilege.' "3 The Court
concluded that the state secrets privilege and "use of in camera
judicial proceedings simply cannot provide the absolute protection
we found necessary in enunciating the Totten rule."
After more than 100 years, the Court explicitly stated that the
"Totten ban" is alive and well, although it had only succeeded as a
complete dismissal to suit in three cases, including Totten.
Although the government later found another basis to prevent the
introduction of confidential information through the Reynolds
standard, it is important that the Court has recognized both options

31
32

Id.at 3-4.
Id at 4.

33 Id at 4-5.

Id.at 1.
Id.at 8-9.
36 See Tenet, 544 U.S. at 8.
37 Id. at 9.
38 Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953)).
39 Id at 11.
34
35
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as distinct prongs. As will be argued later in this article, the much
narrower scope of Totten can be employed to put the broader
scope of Reynolds into context and curb potential abuse.
II. The Evolution of a Doctrine: Reynolds' Three-Prong
Approach and Judicial Interpretation
In its 1953 decision, United States v. Reynolds,4 0 the Supreme
Court redefined the state secrets privilege under a new definition,
employing it as a potential bar to the introduction of evidence in a
civil trial.4 1 The suit involved the death of three civilians in a
crash involving a B-29 plane in 1948.42 After taking off for a
flight with the purpose of testing secret electronic equipment, one
of the plane's engines developed a fire, resulting in the plane
crashing and the death of three civilians aboard.43 Widows of the
civilians brought suit requesting production of the Air Force's
official investigation report, as well as statements of the three
surviving crewmembers." A privilege claim was rejected at the
district court level on the basis that the Federal Tort Claims Act
required production of the documents. 45 Thereafter, the Secretary
of the Air Force submitted a letter stating that it "would not be in
the public interest to furnish this report."46 The district court
ordered production of the documents in order to determine
privilege, to which the government declined. 47 Damages were
awarded, and the court of appeals affirmed both the district court's
decision to require the Air Force to produce the documents and
also to award damages. 48 The Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari and took the case.
In stating its opinion, the Court established what is now known
as "The Reynolds Privilege." 4 9 The privilege is described:

40

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).

41

See id. at 7-8.

42

Id. at 2-3.

43

Id. at 3.

44

Id.
Id. at 4
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 4.

45
46
47

Id. at 5.

48

Id
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (en

49
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(a) [T]he claim of privilege must be formally asserted by the
head of the department charged with responsibility for the
information; (b) the reviewing court has the ultimate
responsibility to determine whether disclosure of the
information in issue would pose a "reasonable danger" to
national security; (c) the court should calibrate the extent of
deference it gives to the executive's assertion with regard to the
plaintiffs need for access to the information; (d) the court can
personally review the sensitive information on an in camera, ex
parte basis if necessary; and (e) once the privilege is found to
attach, it is absolute and cannot be overcome by a showing of
need or offsetting considerations.so
Under this standard, Chief Justice Vinson decided that the suit
should not be allowed to proceed as it posed a "reasonable danger"
to national security." The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of
the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court (the
plaintiffs later settled with the government after remand). 52 Thus,
Reynolds established a second option for courts to dismiss a case
prior to discovery.
However, it is important to note that unlike Totten, which
always results in the complete dismissal of a case if successfully
invoked prior to discovery, Reynolds is viewed under the lens of
an evidentiary privilege.53 When encountering a Reynolds claim, it
is up to the discretion of the district court judge to view the
evidence or not, and also to determine whether the evidence is
indeed privileged. Thus, the judge is presented with four options
under Reynolds: (1) dismiss the case prior to discovery on the
belief that the evidence at issue bars the case as it prevents the
plaintiff s ability to establish a prima facie case or bars the defense
from presenting a valid defense; (2) proceed to discovery and
conduct an in camera ex parte review of the document, decide that
the privileged material is not truly privileged, and allow the suit to
continue; (3) proceed to discovery, review the evidence, determine
that it is in fact privileged but does not prevent the suit from

banc).
50
51
52
53

Chesney, supra note 1, at 1251-52 (citations omitted).
See id at 1286.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12.
Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1077.
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continuing without it, and allow the suit to continue; or (4)
proceed to discovery, review the evidence, and determine that it is
not privileged and should be included in the case.54 Chief Justice
Vinson remanded the case to the district court with these
instructions and a new evidentiary privilege was born."
In the wake of Reynolds, numerous notable decisions were
handed down based on the state secrets privilege, which later
exploded with the extraordinary rendition cases the United States
has been faced with since 9/11 56 Several main categories of cases
where the privilege has been invoked are intellectual property,
extraordinary rendition, and surveillance. What follows is a
synopsis of several important cases that added gloss to the
Reynolds decision and reinterpreted it over time.
a. Intellectual Property
The first case to put a spin on Reynolds was Halpern v. United
States," where an inventor was issued an order of secrecy by the
U.S. government precluding him from using a military patent that
he developed for commercial application." The inventor sued for
damages related to the secrecy order." The government moved to
dismiss, stating among other claims that the state secrets privilege
not only required dismissal of the case, but also forbade the district
court from conducting a trial in camera."o The court struck down
the government's invocation of the state secrets privilege, finding
that "the plaintiff did not require production of any secret
information he did not already possess . . . [and] conducting the
entire trial in camera should suffice to address the government's
concerns." 61 This case was important as it distinguished the
privilege in Reynolds from the complete bar of Totten,
54 See generally El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 304 (4th Cir. 2007)
(examining potential outcomes of a Reynolds inquiry).
55 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 12. Although Chief Justice Vinson did not specifically
lay out these four options under the new standard, later courts would interpret the
standard under such an analysis.
56 Chesney, supra note 1, at 1289.
57 Halpern, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958).
58 Chesney, supra note 1, at 1289.
59 Id.
60 Halpern,258 F.2d at 38.
61 Chesney, supra note 1, at 1290.
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reestablishing both the judge's option to proceed with in camera
review, and also asserting that semi-privileged information (in this
case Halpern already knew the information involved in the
patents) would not bar a case from proceeding.6 2 The gap between
Totten and Reynolds was beginning to widen.
In a more recent case, a plaintiff brought action under the
Invention Secrecy Act (the same Act that Halpern brought action
under), alleging that the U.S. government had illegally used his
patent for a cryptographic encoding device.63 Like Halpern, the
plaintiff in Clift filed a patent application for the device, and a
secrecy order was placed on it, but later lifted.' The plaintiff sued
for damages relating to the secrecy order and also alleged that the
government had appropriated his invention.6 5 In order to prove his
case, the plaintiff sought the production of documents concerning
the "origins and design of several types of cryptographic devices
used by national security and military agencies of the
Government." 66
The district court denied the plaintiffs motion, finding that
"information about the design, construction, and use of the
Government's cryptographic encoding devices falls within the
scope of the state secrets privilege." 67 Citing Reynolds, the court
found that disclosure of the information would pose a "reasonable
danger" to the United States' defense.6 8 Unlike the court in
Halpern, this court found that the danger posed to national
security was so strong that an in camera review was not warranted
and dismissed the case before viewing the evidence.
Without
this information, the court ultimately found that the plaintiff would
not be able to present a prima facie case and dismissed the case.70
The court disapproved of Halpern by stating that the Halpern
court granted too much classified information to Mr. Halpern
Id.
63 Clift v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 101, 102 (D. Conn. 1991).
64 Id. at 102-03.
62

65

Id at 103.

66

Id

67

Id. at 105.

68

Id. at 106.
Clifi, 808 F. Supp. at 106.
Id. at 107.

69
70
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through the use of an in camera trial, and that in this case the
national secrets were too important to warrant even an in camera
review of the documents by the judge." Just as the Halpern
decision displayed that the Reynolds privilege could allow a claim
to continue, this decision showed that the privilege could also act
similar to a "Totten ban,"72 barring the case in certain
circumstances.
b. ExtraordinaryRendition
Starting in the Clinton administration, the U.S. government
embarked on a quiet program of extraordinary rendition where
suspected terrorists could be captured, transported to another
country, and detained against their wills.7 3 When these suspects
were thereafter released, many sought justice in U.S. courts,
alleging illegal rendition, torture, and inhumane treatment, among
other claims.74 In response, the U.S. government often invoked a
Reynolds claim of state secrets privilege and sought to have the
cases dismissed.
In El-Masri v. United States, 76 a German citizen of Lebanese
descent was travelling in Macedonia when Macedonian law
enforcement officials detained him. 7 7 El-Masri was detained for
twenty-three days in Macedonia and was taken by CIA operatives
to a detention facility in Kabul, Afghanistan, where he was held
for another four months.7' Finally, he was transported to Albania
where he was taken to an airport and flown home to Germany. 79 It
was later determined that El-Masri had been captured by
mistake." After returning home, EI-Masri brought suit in the
United States, claiming that he had been "beaten, drugged, bound,
and blindfolded during transport; confined in a small unsanitary

Id. at 109-10.
See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
73 EI-Masri v. U.S., 479 F.3d 296 (2007).
74 Id. at 300.
75 Id. at 296.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 300.
78 Id.
79 EI-Masri, supra note 73, at 300.
80 Chesney, supra note 1, at 1250.
71

72

2014

DISCOVERY AND STATE SECRETS

1077

cell; interrogated several times; and consistently prevented from
communicating with anyone outside the detention facility...
Unsurprisingly, the government asserted a state secrets
privilege claim, relying on Reynolds.8 2 The Director of the CIA
submitted sworn declarations, one of which was classified and
explained why court proceedings would lead to an unreasonable
risk of disclosure." At the district court level, the judge dismissed
the case under the Reynolds standard, prior to discovery, finding
that "special procedures . . . are not appropriate," as "the entire

aim of the suit is to prove the existence of state secrets."84 The
court of appeals affinned.8 ' The court explained that when
assessing this risk, the court is "obliged to accord the 'utmost
deference' to the responsibilities of the executive branch." 86 The
court went on to explain that "[w]here there is a strong showing of
necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly accepted ...
[but] even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the
claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military
secrets are at stake."" The court went on to reaffirm the strength
of the privilege in Reynolds, stating that "the court should not
jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by
insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge
alone, in chambers.""
In applying this standard, the court asked the question not of
whether the general subject matter of the action could be explained
without revealing state secrets, but whether the case could be
litigated." The court decided that it could not.90 The court not
only decided that El-Masri could not make a prima facie showing
without revealing the CIA's most sensitive intelligence operations,
but also that the government would not be able to make a proper

81
82

El-Masri,479 F.3d at 300.
Id. at 301.

89

Id.
EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539 (2006).
El-Masri,supra note 73, at 296.
Id. at 305 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953)).
Id at 306 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)).
Id. at 309.

90

Id. at 313.

83
84
85
86
87
88
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defense even if he could.9' Under those two principles, the court
dismissed his case, and El-Masri was left without justice in the
U.S. courts.
92
Expanding on this case was Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,
which added a third option for a reviewing judge to claim the state
secrets privilege under Reynolds.93 The facts of the case closely
mirror those of El-Masri's plight. An Egyptian national seeking
asylum in Sweden was captured, transferred to American custody,
flown to Egypt, and allegedly kept in a small cell for weeks where
he was beaten and shocked with electricity. 94 Other plaintiffs
joined in the suit, alleging similar claims against Jeppesen
Dataplan, a U.S. corporation that "provided flight planning and
logistical support services to the aircraft and crew on all of the
flights transporting each of the five plaintiffs among the various
locations where they were detained and allegedly subjected to
torture."95 This case is also notable as it is not the U.S.
government itself asserting the claims, but the defense claiming a
privilege as a contractor for the U.S. government. The U.S.
government did intervene prior to Jeppesen answering the
complaint by moving to dismiss under the state secrets privilege. 96
The court began by reasserting the "Totten ban" that was
upheld in Tenet five years earlier.9 7 The court rejected an overly
narrow view of Totten, reaffirming it as a bar to suit when the
subject matter is itself a state secret, and also stating that the bar is
not limited to cases where the plaintiff is in a secret relationship
with the government.9 8 What was more interesting, however, was
the court's treatment of the Reynolds privilege.
In reviewing the court's interpretation of the Reynolds
privilege, the court reestablished the two bases relied on in ElMasri and also added a new one. If the privilege is found to

91 El-Masri,supra note 73, at 310.
92 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
93

Id. at 1070.

94

Id. at 1074.

95
96

Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1076.

97 See id. at 1077-78.
98 Mohamed, 614 F.3d, at 1079.
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attach, the reviewing judge is faced with three options.99 If "the
plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie elements of her claim with
nonprivileged evidence, then the court may dismiss her claim as it
would with any plaintiff who cannot prove her case.""oo Under
this first option, the result would be similar to that in Totten, and
the claim would be completely dismissed without chance for
discovery. Under the second option, "if the privilege deprives the
defendant of information that would otherwise give the defendant
a valid defense to the claim, then the court may grant summary
judgment to the defendant."o' This second option thus serves as a
"Totten ban" as well. The third option, referred to as the "mosaic
theory,"02 states that:
[E]ven if the claims and defenses might theoretically be
established without relying on privileged evidence, it may be
impossible to proceed with the litigation because-privileged
evidence being inseparable from nonprivileged information that
will be necessary to the claims or defenses-litigating the case
to judgment on the merits would present an unacceptable risk of
disclosing state secrets. 103
Under this principle, if the state secrets and evidence are so
intertwined that litigating the case would result in the leakage of
confidential information, the case must be dismissed. Again, this
is a similar result to that in Totten. This third option broadened an
already strong Reynolds state secrets privilege, and also muddied
the standard, as will be seen below. It is important to note that
under any of these three principles, if the judge determines that the
information is either not privileged or the case can proceed in spite
of the privileged information, the case may proceed, as Reynolds

99

Id. at 1083.

100 Id. (quoting Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (1998)) (internal quotations
omitted).
101 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
102 See TODD GARVEY & EDWARD C. Liu, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41741, THE
STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE: PREVENTING THE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION DURING CIVIL LITIGATION 5 (2011), http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/secrecy/R41741.pdf (noting that the "mosaic theory" is based on "the principal
that federal judges are not properly equipped to determine which pieces of information,
when taken together, could result in the disclosure 'of the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect').
103 Mohamed, supra note 49, at 1083.
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involves an evidentiary privilege and does not require the
dismissal of a case solely based on the presence of privileged
information.
The court went on to apply the facts of the case to both the
"Totten ban" and the Reynolds privilege.' 04 The court rejected a
Totten claim, alleging that while Totten would bar some of the
plaintiffs claims, the entire subject matter was not a state secret,
and thus Reynolds was a more appropriate standard.' 5 The court
eventually decided the case under the "mosaic theory," finding
after a Reynolds analysis that "the claims and possible defenses are
so infused with state secrets that the risk of disclosing them is both
apparent and inevitable." 0 6 The future of this third category of
dismissal remains uncertain and will almost certainly lead to an
increase in future litigation. It is unclear what mix of claims and
defenses will rise to a level requiring complete pre-discovery
dismissal under this new theory.
c. Surveillance
With the explosion in technology that has accompanied the
beginning of the 2 1 st century, government surveillance has become
an important concern for many Americans, and non-U.S. citizens
alike. Directly following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush
directed the National Security Agency (NSA) "to conduct a
warrantless communications surveillance program."'
Under the
program, the NSA intercepted communications coming in and out
of the United States through alleged terrorist networks. 08 The
government claimed that messages would only be intercepted "if
there were reasonable grounds to believe that one party to the
communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated
terrorist organization."'
The New York Times broke the story in
2005, and the plaintiff, a Muslim charity with operations in over
50 countries, soon after brought suit alleging warrantless

104

See id.

105

Id. at 1084-85.

Id. at 1089.
107 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2007).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1194.
106

2014

DISCOVERY AND STATE SECRETS

1081

electronic surveillance." 0 Once again, the government asserted a
state secrets privilege claim."'
The appellate court first found that the subject matter of the
litigation was not a state secret, and thus rejected a Totten claim.112
The court found that the President had already publicly
acknowledged the existence of the surveillance program, and the
government had officially declared Al-Haramain to be a terrorist
group with ties to al Qaeda."' As the government had tried to
assuage the American public's fears that they would not be subject
to the program, the court found that these disclosures proved that
the subject matter was not itself a state secret.'14
When assessing the Reynolds claim, the court looked both at
whether Al-Haramain had been surveilled, and at an issue with a
sealed document."' In showing its power of discretion under the
Reynolds standard, the court conducted an in camera review of the
sealed document, finding a strong showing of necessity by AlHaramain to establish a prima facie case."6 After reviewing the
document, the court determined that the document was in fact a
state secret and subject to privilege.' '7 Furthermore, the court
went on to explain that just as the document itself was subject to
privilege, so too were "reconstructed memories" which could
serve to "circumvent[] the document's absolute privilege.""'8
After finding this information to be privileged, the court found that
Al-Haramain could not establish a prima facie case, and dismissed
the plaintiffs' suit." 9
Four years later, the American public's fears regarding
electronic eavesdropping and surveillance were realized. Again at
issue was the warrantless surveillance program in Al-Haramain,

110 Id. at 1192, 1194.

Ill See id at 1193.
112

Id. at 1198.

113 Al-Haramain, supra note 107, at 1198.
114 Id. at 1200.
115
116

Id. at 1202.
Id. 1203.

118

Id. at 1204-05.
Id. at 1204.

119

Al-Haramain,supra note 107, at 1205.
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but residential telephone customers brought the case this time. 120
The plaintiffs, AT&T customers, alleged that the U.S. government
was eavesdropping on their communications, in violation of their
First and Fourth Amendment rights. 12 1 In stark contrast to the
government's claims of narrowly targeted interception of alleged
terrorist communication, the complaint claimed that the
government "operated a 'dragnet collection' of communications
records by 'continuously solicit[ing] and obtain[ing] the disclosure
major databases of stored telephone
of all information in AT&T's
1 22

and Internet records."'

After the government moved for summary judgment, the
district court dismissed the claim, ruling that the plaintiffs did not

have standing to sue as they did not make a prima facie showing
that they were actually harmed (or subjected to surveillance) under
the program.123 On appeal, the appellate court reversed, finding
that the defendants did in fact make a prima facie showing that
their communications passed through the dragnet and were
The appellate court remanded with
potentially captured. 12 4
instructions for the district court to determine whether the
government's state secrets privilege claim was proper to dismiss
the suit. 125
On remand, citing Al-Haramain, the court found that because
the government publicly disclosed information about the
surveillance program, the subject matter was not itself a state
secret, and again rejected a Totten claim.126 The court then moved
on to a Reynolds analysis, and determined that significant evidence
should be excluded, but that such exclusion was not a complete
bar to the case.127 Again citing Al-Haramain, the court found that
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)128 "preempts the

See Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 905 (2011).
Id.
122 Id. (citations omitted).
123 Id. at 907.
124 Id. at 910.
125 Id. at 913-14.
126 Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103009, at 68 (N.D. Cal.
July 23, 2013).
127 Id
128 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885 (2012).
120
121
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state secrets privilege in connection with electronic surveillance

for intelligence purposes . . . ."12 9 Accordingly, as the court did in
Al-Haramain, the judge decided that the in camera review
procedure from "FISA applies and preempts the determination of
evidentiary preclusion under the state secrets doctrine."l 30 The
court reserved ruling on the case until further briefing,'3 ' but
clearly this was a blow to the state secrets privilege, and showed
that judges may increasingly be more inclined to conduct an in
camera review before finding the privilege applies.
In 2007, Robert Timothy Reagan of the Federal Judicial Center
published a guide for judges entitled: Keeping Government
Secrets: A Pocket Guidefor Judges on the State-Secrets Privilege,
the Classified Procedures Act, and Court Security Officers. 3 2 At
issue in all of these cases is what the government would
characterize as "classified" information: "information designated
by the executive branch as not subject to public discussion ...
[which] [t]he unauthorized disclosure of. . . can cause irreparable
damage to the national security and loss of human life."' 33 While
"[g]enerally access to classified information requires a security
clearance[,] Article III judges are automatically entitled to access

to classified information necessary to resolve issues before
them."' 3 4 The guide goes on to explain that criminal proceedings
are governed by the Classified Information Procedures Act
3 ,
(CIPA)"'
that outlines court procedures for classified
information, and that civil cases should mirror these.' 36
So how should judges proceed? First, they must determine if
the privilege has been submitted properly, as "the privilege must
be (1) invoked by the United States government (2) by formal
claim made by the head of the department controlling the secret

130

Id. at 7 (citation omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
Id at 7.

131

Id at 15.

132

ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, KEEPING GOVERNMENT SECRETS: A POCKET GUIDE

129

FOR JUDGES ON THE STATE-SECRETS PRIVILEGE, THE CLASSIFIED PROCEDURES ACT, AND
COURT SECURITY OFFICERS

(2007).

133 Id. at 1.
I34 Id. at 3.
135 18 U.S.C. app. 3
136 See id. at 8.

§§ 1-16 (2006).
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(3) after personal review of the matter."'
If this procedure is
properly followed, the judge has flexibility under Reynolds to
determine whether or not to conduct an in camera review, or to
decide the information is classified without reviewing the
document itself.138 The guide cites Reynolds for the idea that "the
court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is
meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence,
even by the judge alone, in chambers."'
This is determined
under the previously noted "reasonable danger" standard, and is
weighed against the necessity of the information (while not being
able to be overcome by necessity alone).' 4 0 Thus, a good deal of
discretion is left up to the judge.
In summary, following the history of cases and judicial
guidelines, a judge should use the following thought process: (1)
determine if the subject matter of the case is a state secret itself,
and if so, apply Totten and dismiss the case; (2) if not a state secret
in itself, determine if a Reynolds claim has been submitted
properly; (3) based on the public record, necessity of both parties,
and the state secrets privilege, determine if an in camera review is
warranted; (4) determine if the information is privileged; (5) if the
information is privileged, determine if a) it is needed to establish a
prima facie case, b) it is needed to establish a proper defense, or c)
it is so intertwined with the case, and dismiss if the answer is yes
to any of these three; and (6) if the case can proceed without use of
the privileged material, allow the suit to proceed.
This is a fairly amorphous standard, especially in light of the
"mosaic theory" prong of the fifth step and has led to calls for
reform. Since 2001, over 120 law review articles have been
written regarding reform of the privilege in response to the
explosion of state secrets cases, as well as much being written
about the privilege in the media.141 Judging by the evolving
standard of review found in the case history, and in light of the
court's recent decision in Jewel, it seems that the doctrine might

137 Id.at 4-5.
138
139

See id at 5.
REAGAN, supra note 132, at 5 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10

(1953)).
140 See id at 5-6.
141 Donohue, supra note 3, at 78.
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be ripe for change.
III. An Evolving Standard: Can and Will Congress Change
the State Secrets Doctrine?
Before determining if the state secrets privilege should be
changed, the first question to ask is if it can be. Most scholars feel
that the doctrine has roots in the Constitution, but has "emerge[d]
in the traditional common-law fashion." 4 2
While the
"constitutional core of the state secrets privilege is best understood
as a consequence of functional considerations associated with the
particular advantages and responsibilities of the executive branch
vis-A-vis national defense and foreign relations ...
this
constitutional core does not account for the full scope of the
privilege."l 43
Furthermore, courts have cited legislation as
overriding the privilege at times (e.g., FISA), and the privilege
itself has evolved over time, as evidenced by the case history.14 4
As the court explained in El-Masri, "[t]he state secrets privilege
that the United States has interposed in this civil proceeding thus
has a firm foundation in the Constitution, in addition to its basis in
the common law of evidence." 45 Accordingly, Congress could
legislate to reform the privilege if it chose to do so.146
Twice Congress has attempted to do just this, with the
introduction of the State Secrets Protection Act, originally
introduced in 2008.'
The purpose of the bill was "[t]o enact a
safe, fair, and responsible state secrets privilege."' 4 8 Principally,
the bill would no longer leave it to the discretion of judges to
determine if an in camera review is warranted, and they would
always have to review the evidence in camera if a proper basis of
privilege has been established.' 49 The government would be
required to submit an affidavit explaining the privilege asserted,

142

143
144
145
146
147
148

149

Chesney, supra note 1, at 1308-09.
Id. at 1309.
See id. at 1309-10.
EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 304 (2007).
See Chesney, supranote 1, at 1310.
State Secrets Protection Act, S.2533, I10th Cong. (2008).
Id
See id. § 4052(b).

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

1086

Vol. XXXIX

which the court would be forced to review.so If the evidence
warrants an ex parte proceeding, hearings should be limited to
attorneys with appropriate security clearances."' If the court finds
that the information is privileged, it should not be disclosed.'5 2
However, if the court finds that a non-privileged substitute can
give an "equivalent opportunity to litigate the claim or defense ...
the court shall order the United States to provide such a
substitute."'
The bill sought to construct a larger hurdle to
dismissal under the state secrets privilege.
However, the bill has failed passage both times it was
introduced. Originally, after being approved by an eleven to eight
vote to be sent to the Senate floor for consideration, it was met
with intense opposition.1' The biggest opposition to the bill came
from Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey, who largely cited the
doctrine's long-standing history and importance to national
security.' 5 He further went on to argue that the privilege was
"rooted in the Constitution and is not merely a common law
privilege."5 6
Others claimed the bill is "[u]nnecessary,
[u]nconstitutional, and undemocratic.""' These oppositionists
also claim that there has been no evidence of abuse.'
Statistical
studies on the subject have fallen both ways, with scholar Robert
Chesney finding no definable increase in frequency in the
privilege being asserted during the Bush administration, and no
"breaking [ofj new ground" in respect to scope.' 59 However, one
150 See id. § 4053(d).

151 See id § 4052(c).
152 Id. § 4054(e).
153 S.2533, § 4054(f).
154 Jeannie Shawl, Senate Judiciary Panel Advances Bill Curbing State Secrets
Privilege, JURIST.ORG (Apr. 26, 2008, 12:32 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2008/
04/senate-judiciary-panel-advances-bill.php.
155 Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, U.S. Attorney General, to Patrick J. Leahy,
Senate Judiciary Chairman (Mar. 31, 2008), availableat http://www.justice.gov/archive/
ola/views-letters/ 10-2/03-31-08-ag-ltr-re-s2533-state-secrets.pdf.
156 Id.
157 Andrew M. Grossman, The State Secret Protection Act: Unnecessary,
Unconstitutional,

and

Undemocratic,

HERITAGE.ORG

(June

4,

2009),

http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/the-state-secret-protection-act-unnecessaryunconstitutional-and-undemocratic.
158 See id.

159 Chesney, supra note 1, at 1301-05.
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must ask whether such a nebulous standard can be subject to
abuse, especially in light of the recent groundbreaking cases
involving the governmental surveillance of ordinary U.S.
citizens.'60
IV. A Dated Standard: The Totten/Reynolds Dichotomy and
The Potential For Reform
With the advent of new technologies bringing increased
surveillance and more complicated military tactics, it is nearly
certain that the state secrets privilege will continue to be used as a
governmental defense. As it now stands, the privilege is a difficult
one for judges to apply effectively and evenly, and damages the
efficiency of the judicial system. What is a "reasonable danger?"
How much necessity is needed to overcome this danger? Are
some state secrets more important than others? All of these are
questions that judges now face, and could be mitigated with a
more discrete standard of judicial review.
First, tracking the bill that was introduced in 2008, a judge
should be forced to view the privileged information if he
determines that the privilege applies via an in camera review. As
previously stated, Article III judges are already qualified to view
classified information, and have sworn to uphold the Constitution,
including the safekeeping of confidential information. Whatever
the reasoning of the Reynolds Court in making this review
discretionary, it is outweighed by the potential for abuse by the
defense should the information not truly be privileged. Indeed,
even in Reynolds, where the judge did not proceed to in camera
review and dismissed the case prior to discovery, the evidence at
issue turned out to not be truly privileged information.' 6 ' As Louis
Fisher stated in an article relating to the state secrets privilege,
"[b]y failing to examine the document, the Reynolds Court risked
being fooled. As it turned out, it was."' 62
Requiring in camera review would mitigate this issue almost
entirely. Judges, sworn to secrecy, would view the information in
160 See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (2006); Jewel v. Nat'1 Sec.
Agency, 673 F.3d 902 (2011).
161 See Herring v. U.S., 424 F.3d 384 (2005).
162

Louis Fisher, People v. State, LEGAL TIMES (Oct. 7, 2007), available at

http://loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/secretsFisher 10_1_07.pdf.
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a limited capacity, and make a threshold determination of whether
the information is truly privileged. The case could then move on
accordingly.
Furthermore, the privilege should be simplified and the
distinction between Totten and Reynolds collapsed. Indeed, the
recent legislation introduced on the Senate floor seems to track
Reynolds and not really mention Totten.
Perpetuating the
confusing lines between the two is the Ninth Circuit's recent
decision in Jeppesen Dataplan,by adding a third area of dismissal
if the court determines that the prima facie case or defenses are too
intertwined with state secrets for the case to go on. How should a
judge make this decision?
I suggest that this third "mosaic theory" prong alluded to in ElMasri is really Totten in disguise. If the claims and defenses are
so intertwined with state secrets as to not allow the case to move
forward, does this not mean that the subject matter of the case is
essentially a state secret? Accordingly, I would make this the first
step in the judicial process. A judge should ask if the subject
matter is so clearly a state secret that the case cannot proceed.
Only under this prong can the judge proceed without conducting in
camera review. Unlike the "mosaic theory," which broadens
Reynolds in scope, this would curtail the potential abuse incurred
when a case is thrown out prior to discovery, while still providing
for an outright dismissal in extreme cases. As stated previously,
Totten has only been successfully applied fewer than a handful of
times, and an outright bar to suit prior to a chance for discovery
should track this trend not be expanded via Reynolds.
If the judge determines that the subject matter (i.e. claims and
defenses) is not a state secret in itself, the case should proceed
with in camera review. Here, the judge will view the evidence at
issue and first make a determination if the evidence is privileged.
If she determines it is not, the case will resume with the evidence
included.
If the judge determines the evidence is indeed
privileged, she will ask the same two questions originally asked in
Reynolds: 1) can the plaintiff establish a prima facie case; and 2)
can the defense establish a proper defense? If the answer is no to
either, the case must be dismissed. If the answer is yes, and the
case can proceed without the privileged evidence being included,
the judge should allow the case to proceed.
By curtailing the third prong enunciated in Jeppesen Dataplan
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and incorporating Totten as an initial step, the court would both be
protecting the privilege and curbing its potential for abuse.
V. Conclusion
As we enter a new age in information technology, the state
secrets privilege becomes an increasingly important doctrine.
Recent decisions to broaden the privilege's scope have moved the
privilege in the wrong direction, and have granted the government
too much power to dismiss potential claims. In too many
situations, judges dismiss a plaintiffs claim before viewing the
evidence at issue. This pre-discovery dismissal leaves a plaintiff
without any recourse in U.S. courts, and does not align with the
Due Process clause of the Constitution.
By reclassifying the vague "mosaic theory" option as what it
truly is (a "Totten ban"), and proceeding to in camera review in all
but the most extreme cases of national security, courts can
redefine the state secrets privilege as a legitimate defense to cases
involving confidential information, while providing plaintiffs with
increased due process at little cost.

